Notre Europe's viewpoint
| 21/12/2009
As recently as a few days ago it was difficult to imagine a satisfactory agreement in Copenhagen. The objective of a legally binding accord was opposed from the start by one of the two largest greenhouse-gas (GHG) emitters, the USA; and the objective of "transparency" (authorising international inspectors to check on emissions reductions) was opposed by the other major emitter, China. What is more, it remained difficult to compare the efforts that different states were prepared to make, due to competing years of reference - 1990 and 2005 - and the fact that some countries talked of real emissions reductions and others of reduced carbon intensity (the latter measure is an entirely different affair, one which might allow a continued increase in GHG emissions, as in China's case).
This unprecedented international negotiation linked the preservation of global public goods (that is, stabilisation of the climate) to hard economic and financial outcomes, and it brought politicians, economic actors and civil society into the same tent. Given such complexity, what might Europeans have expected?
First, and beyond a desire not to be the only ones to pursue a properly ambitious climate policy, Europeans wanted the agreement to shed as much light as possible on the international context in which they will transition towards green growth. Since the EU 27 are committed (since 2008) to the "20/20/20 by 2020" as part of the energy-climate package, it must be possible to anticipate the risks to European business of environmental dumping by producers from third-party countries with less demanding standards. This is why it was seen as essential to have binding commitments on GHG emissions and a fair division of the cost of helping least-developed countries; by such means the world's countries would demonstrate their good faith and their concrete deeds.
Europe's solidarity on this issue contrasted with a atmosphere of mutual suspicion among the continent's trading partners - one which continues to offer few guarantees as to their short-term commitment.
Second, Europeans sought to assert their leadership in the climate change issue. In a sense they have succeeded with aplomb, since they remain the most committed - and this despite quasi-zero rates of economic growth, which will make their effort harder still. But Europeans are correct to feel that the last few hours of negotiation slipped away from them, to the particular benefit of the USA and China, whose mutual interest was to minimise the ambition of the final political declaration. Yet China, which used its membership of the G77 to justify its reticence, is becoming a highly competitive producer of green technology. China will have much influence in future negotiations, in a paradoxical way - both as the largest GHG emitter and as a potentially major actor in green technology (it is already the fourth-largest producer of wind turbines and the second in terms of wind-power installation).
Without the impetus given by Europe's ambitious stance, it is unlikely that we would have seen such an unprecedented mobilisation of the world's most important heads of state during the final frenetic 24 hours of negotiations. However, the manner in which the talks unfolded shows that the climate issue is causing a redistribution of power - both economic and geopolitical - on the world stage. It is creating new relationships between developed and emerging economies, and between civil society and political leaders. Europe enjoys a head start on the climate issue. It must continue to defend its leadership by placing sustainable green growth at the heart of its agenda.
